Spouse’s Second Claim Dismissed by 7th Circuit
Reaffirming a ruling announced in March 2004, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a second appeal by the spouse of an alleged compulsive gambler who sought to exclude her husband from an Indiana casino. In Brown v. Argosy Gaming Co., L.P., 384 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 2004), the court ruled that the plaintiff had not appealed a final judgment, so there was nothing for the court to decide.
In her complaint, Johnnie Brown alleged that Argosy Casino & Hotel in Lawrenceburg, Ind., negligently failed to honor her request to bar her husband from gambling. The trial court denied Brown’s request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Despite contradictory statements in other pleadings, Brown’s initial appeal asked only that the court certify to the Indiana Supreme Court the question of whether she had a cause of action for negligent failure to exclude her spouse. That issue cannot be appealed, said Judge Ilana Rovner, who wrote for the unanimous federal panel in March 2003. Moreover, since the trial court had dismissed the complaint without prejudice, that ruling also was not final. Brown had not appealed the denial of her preliminary injunction request, which could have been appealed.
On remand, the district judge entered final judgment against Brown, and she once again appealed only the denial of her certification motion to the 7th Circuit Court. On Sept. 15, 2004, Judge Rovner, who wrote for the court again, held that certification was inappropriate because Brown had not appealed the merits of her claim, meaning that an answer from the Indiana Supreme Court could not affect an underlying lawsuit. Noting that Stulajter v. Harrah’s Indiana Corp., 808 N.E.2d 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) and Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc., 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003) both had rejected causes of action very similar to Brown’s, the court found that there was “little uncertainty” in Indiana law regarding the question that she posed, and it affirmed the district court’s denial of her motion for certification.
